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Part 1 What is religion? 
Three Positions 
What is religion, and does it have any legitimacy? There are many different 
answers to each of these questions, but ultimately any given answer to either question 
embodies one of three attitudes: 
1                   One of uncritical acceptance, such as we would 
presumably find among people living 3,500 
years ago; 
2                   One of rejection, such as we would find in 
someone, such as Freud, whose career involved 
examining religion, and therefore making an 
object out of it, as opposed to having religion; 
or 
3                   One of critical and reflective acceptance, such 
as we find in William James, Rudolph Otto, and 
Mircea Eliade, these being scholars who took it 
upon themselves to supplement critical 
scientific rationalism, such as we find in Freud, 
with firsthand knowledge of the experiences 
involved in being religious. 
In the present work, the views of James, Otto, and Eliade will be stated, 
compared, contrasted, and evaluated. It will be found that they have much the same 
view as to the emotional basis of religion and also as to its psychological function. In 
their view, the essence of religious sentiment is that this world is not all that there is 
and, moreover, that one cannot fail to have this view while retaining psychological 
health. Each of these authors acknowledges that there exist psychologically healthy, 
self-identified agnostics and atheists; but they also hold that such individuals, whether 
they know it or not, hold some variant of the view just described. They also hold that 
when people genuinely do not have this view, they succumb to various different forms 
of psychological morbidity. 
It must be stated at the outset that, when these authors refer to “religion”, they 
are typically referring to its subjective, emotional side, not to its objective, 
institutional side. At the same time, none of these authors is referring to the mindset of 
someone who, in the 21st century, describes himself as “spiritual.” For reasons to be 
discussed, the person who self-describes as “spiritual” is in much the same category as 
a self-described atheist. 21st Century ‘spiritualism’, so these authors would say, is just 
another manifestation of contemporary nihilism and is therefore not an expression of 
the actual spiritualism that these authors have in mind but of its absence. 
Let us start by describing the previously mentioned attitudes of uncritical 
acceptance, rejection, and critical acceptance. 
Uncritical acceptance 
Someone is genuinely uncritically accepting of religion if they don’t even know 
of the possibility of not accepting it. It is not possible for a member of any 
contemporary society to have this attitude. So-called “fundamentalists” are not 
uncritically accepting of religion. A contemporary Christian or Moslem 
fundamentalists chooses to be a fundamentalist. He lives in a society of non-
fundamentalists; he has access to books, newspapers, and websites that represent 
views antithetical to his own. The contemporary fundamentalist is reacting to non-
religious views and to religious but non-fundamentalists views. By contrast, the 
spiritualism of the stone age tribesman is not a reaction, that is to say, it is not a 
defense against some other view. 
Moreover, the tribesman’s views do not represent mere credulity or 
acquiescence to some set of social norms. In believing that some bolt of lightning 
represents the wrath of a higher being, he isn’t acquiescing to social norms or to a 
charismatic leader. He believes it because it is how he naturally sees the world, not 
because he has been taught that this is how he should see the world. The 
contemporary fundamentalist is in a very different category: his beliefs are the result 
of a long process of acculturation, usually accompanied by considerable internal 
struggle. 
Rejection 
There are two very different forms of religious rejectionism: the authentic kind 
and the inauthentic kind. An example of the authentic kind is someone, e.g. Freud, 
who genuinely has a rationalistic world view and, on that basis, simply doesn’t accept 
a religious world view. 
An example of the inauthentic kind is anyone whose rejectionism is simply a 
way of fitting in or moving ahead. People often join atheist groups because they want 
to fit in with others or because they believe membership in such a group to be a source 
of prestige. This form of rejectionism is presumably a historical consequence of the 
work of authentic rejectionists—as in, the latter changed our worldview in such a way 
as to make a non-religious view be socially normal—but the mentality involved is 
much closer that involved in religious fundamentalism than it is to that involved in 
authentic, rationalism-based rejectionism. 
In most cases, today’s atheist or secular humanist is simply following the herd, 
just as the true-believer was one thousand years ago, and his views are likely to be 
equally dogmatic. So even if what the contemporary atheist believes is more 
reasonable than what a medieval peasant believes, his reasons for believing it may 
well be equally emotional and equally spurious. Indeed, the brain-centers that mediate 
‘militant’ atheism are identical with those that mediate religious fundamentalism. 
Critical acceptance 
There are two ways to be reflective about religion: reductively and non-
reductively. Freud was reductively reflective about religion. In his view, God 
represents the father, and religion exists to mediate various biological and social 
functions (e.g. preventing incest, directing aggression towards appropriate targets, and 
inculcating superego). William James was non-reductively rational about religion. He 
didn’t deny that religions served (or used to serve) various social functions. Nor did 
he deny that religion was amenable to eliminative explanations of the kind that Freud 
would later provide. His position is not so much that those positions are wrong as it is 
that they are incomplete. There are indeed reductionist truths about religion, James 
grants, but there are also non-reductionist truths; and, so he claims, it is truths of the 
non-reductionist kind that the very essence of religion lies. 
It is important to note that there are, or at least could be, both 
reductive and non-reductive truths about religion. James himself makes this point. 
Religion is a psychological phenomenon and can be examined as such. It can be said 
why people are religious, just as it can be said why people do science. It could well be 
that Newton poured himself into his scientific researches as a way of fleeing from 
painful childhood memories, and it might well be that Martin Luther’s religious fervor 
is to be explained in much the same way. But, as James himself says, the 
psychological backstory is not always the whole story. Scientific positions must be 
understood on their own terms, and it is at least possible that the same is true of 
religious positions. Consequently, even if everything Freud says about religion is 
correct—even if God is simply a personification of superego and even if ‘holy 
injunctions’ are mere defenses against incestuous urges---it doesn’t follow that 
religion is nothing other than a giant neurosis. Supposing that Smith becomes a 
medical researcher because he suffers from terrible asthma, it doesn’t follow that his 
researches are nothing but expressions of asthma-related distress. Similarly, supposing 
that Martin Luther turned to God because his own father abandoned him as a child, it 
doesn’t follow that his subsequent religious activity is nothing but an expression of 
anguish over not having had a father. 
Of course, it will be said that, whereas science has both subjective and 
objective sides, religion is pure subjectivity, there being nothing real corresponding to 
the various psychological phenomena involved in it. But, of course, this is precisely 
what James, Otto, and Eliade question, and it is to their work that we now turn. 
In what follows, we will use the term ‘perceptible world’ to refer to the 
world qua entity that can be known through our senses and through scientific 
examination of the data thereby made available to us. It must be borne in mind that, in 
this context, ‘perceptible’ means ‘knowable either through our senses or through 
rational inference from what our senses disclose to us.’ 
  
Part 2 James’ position 
Religion vs. Science 
According to James, the essence of religion is that the perceptible world is not 
the whole world, since an ‘invisible order’ suffuses and undergirds the perceptible 
world, giving it meaning and moral structure:  
  
Were one asked to characterize the life of 
religion in the broadest and most general terms 
possible, one might say that it consists of the 
belief that there is an unseen order, and that our 
supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting 
ourselves thereto. This belief and this 
adjustment are the religious attitude in the 
soul.[1] 
  
This quotation explained: According to the scientific rationalist, the world is 
just a machine, consisting of so many parts governed by so many mechanisms, and is 
to be understood in much the same way as a machine. According to religion, says 
James, this is not the case, since the world known to us through our science is 
not all there is, the reason being there also exists an ‘invisible order’ that suffuses the 
perceptible Moreover, this invisible order gives the world meaning and it gives 
individual human beings a purpose. A given person’s life is meaningful to the extent 
that he is on the right side of this ‘invisible order’ and meaningless to the extent that 
he is on the wrong side of it. 
Religion as Psychologically Necessary 
Notice that, in this particular quotation, James is expressing a value-judgment; 
he is just saying what, in his view, the essence of religion is.  But it is the very 
purpose of this work of James to express a value-judgment about this conceit: and that 
judgment is that even if it is false, we benefit from believing it to be true. James’ 
argument is that, even if God does not in fact exist, belief in God gives one a certain 
measure of God-like strength. In a word—believing it makes it real:  
  
We can act AS IF there were a God; feel AS IF 
we were free; consider Nature AS IF she were 
full of special designs; lay plans AS IF we were 
to be immortal; and we find then that these 
words do make a genuine difference in our 
moral life. Our faith THAT these unintelligible 
objects actually exist proves thus to be a full 
equivalent in praktischer Hinsicht, as Kant calls 
it, or from the point of view of our action, for a 
knowledge of WHAT they might be, in case we 
were permitted positively to conceive them. So 
we have the strange phenomenon, as Kant 
assures us, of a mind believing with all its 
strength in the real presence of a set of things of 
no one of which it can form any notion 
whatsoever. [2] 
  
In and of itself, this passage only says that the consequences of belief in God 
are in some respects interchangeable with those of God’s actually existing; it does not 
say what those consequences are or whether they are good. But one page later, James 
says that belief in God gives us strength and is therefore good: 
  
The sentiment of reality can indeed attach itself 
so strongly to our object of belief that our 
whole life is polarized through and through, so 
to speak, by its sense of the existence of the 
thing believed in, and yet that thing, for purpose 
of definite description, can hardly be said to be 
present to our mind at all. It is as if a bar of 
iron, without touch or sight, with no 
representative faculty whatever, might 
nevertheless be strongly endowed with an inner 
capacity for magnetic feeling; and as if, through 
the various arousals of its magnetism by 
magnets coming and going in its neighborhood, 
it might be consciously determined to different 
attitudes and tendencies. Such a bar of iron 
could never give you an outward description of 
the agencies that had the power of stirring it so 
strongly; yet of their presence, and of their 
significance for its life, it would be intensely 
aware through every fibre of its being. [3] 
  
  And therein lies the basic message of The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (TVRE), to wit: Strength comes from belief, and weakness from doubt. 
An Incoherence in James’ Analysis 
There is a deep incoherence in what James is saying. One cannot derive 
strength from a belief that one doesn’t have. So if someone who doesn’t believe in 
God is to derive strength from such a belief, he must make himself have that belief 
and therefore make himself believe what he doesn’t really believe. But if he does that, 
he is making himself weaker, not stronger, since he is undermining the integrity of his 
own belief-system and also therefore of any other psychological faculties of his whose 
integrity depends on that of his belief-system. 
A Deeper Coherence 
But there is a coherent point beneath this incoherent one. The basic message of 
TVRE is not exactly that we should believe in a higher power. It is rather that, 
whether we know it or not, our motivations, emotional dispositions, and values are 
hewed to the presumption that there is a God who superintends a moral order. The 
self-identified true believer consciously and explicitly affirms that this presumption, 
and the self-identified disbeliever denies them. But even though their theories differ, 
says James, their emotional architectures do not, and in each case the psychological 
faculty responsible for affect, emotion, and motivation is that of the true believer: 
  
Nevertheless, if we look on man's whole mental 
life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in 
them apart from their learning and science, and 
that they inwardly and privately follow, we 
have to confess that the part of it of which 
rationalism can give an account is relatively 
superficial. It is the part that has the prestige 
undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can 
challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and 
put you down with words. But it will fail to 
convince or convert you all the same, if your 
dumb intuitions are opposed to its 
conclusions.[4] 
  
James then says that the well-springs of intuition, and indeed of what we might 
call genius, lie in this subterraneous psychological realm: 
  
If you have intuitions at all, they come from a 
deeper level of your nature than the loquacious 
level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole 
subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, 
your needs, your divinations, have prepared the 
premises, of which your consciousness now 
feels the weight of the result; and something in 
you absolutely KNOWS that that result must be 
truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, 
however clever, that may contradict it.[5] 
  
It is in the context of these points that James’ discussion of mysticism is to be 
understood. According to James, mystical experiences are ‘ineffable’, ‘transient’, and 
‘passive’; and they are also experienced as being ‘noetic’, i.e. as being instances of 
knowledge, as opposed to feeling. What this suggests is that mystical experiences are 
about letting go and letting one’s ‘real feelings’, for lack of a better term, rise to the 
surface. Strikingly, people who take nitrous oxide, as James himself points out, have 
mystical experiences (or experiences similar thereto), and so do people who take LSD. 
Nitrous oxide and LSD are both disinhibitory agents, meaning that they deregulate the 
flow of chemical information between synapses; and this fact obviously confirms the 
hypotheses that mystical experiences are about disinhibition, as does the fact 
that antipsychotic medications are inhibitory agents. 
In conclusion, James’ position seems to be that it is not really up to us whether 
or not to ‘believe’, since belief is built into our psychological structure. James is not 
making the absurd point that someone living now should have the same theories as 
someone living 12,000 years ago. Rather is making the non-absurd point that however 
much our theories may change, the beliefs that are etched into our unchanging human 
essence are closer to those of the religious than of the non-religious person. 
  
Part 3 Otto’s Position 
The Numinous: What It Isn’t 
Otto’s position is that the essence of religious sentiment is the sense that the 
world is suffused by a presence that cannot possibly be known through rational 
inquiry, let alone sense-perception. Otto refers to this hidden presence as ‘the 
numinous’ (from numen: Latin for divine or awesome presence). In order to 
understand what the numinous is, says Otto, we must be very clear about what it isn’t. 
God, conceived of as a kind of super-person, is not the numinous. Quite the 
contrary, says Otto. If God is conceived of as an ogre who lives on Mt. Olympus, then 
there is nothing mysterious about him, and he is therefore the very opposite of 
numinous. Much the same holds if God is conceived of as being utterly rational and 
powerful and just; for thus conceived, God is basically a person, albeit one free of the 
usual limitations, and there is therefore nothing mysterious or ‘numinous’ about him. 
For this reason, Otto says that, if indeed God is hyper-intelligent, hyper-just, and the 
like, those are merely “synthetical” attributes of his, meaning that it is not in virtue of 
his having them that he is God. To be God is not to be a superman but is rather to be 
the ‘numinous’ presence that pervades the world. 
 Also, the numinous is not to be identified with the miraculous. For a miracle to 
occur is for a sapient being to create breach of natural law. The supposition that a 
sapient being is violating natural law is simply another hypothesis; and were that 
hypothesis to prove correct, it would not be a rejection of a rationalist world view but 
a mere modification of the way such a world view is applied. Consequently, the 
miraculous is not identical with, or even necessarily an expression of, the numinous. 
The Numinous: What It Is 
Otto does not quite say the numinous is, but he identifies some of its key 
attributes: 
*The numinous is either awe inspiring or terrifying (more on this below). 
*Awareness of it involves a state of fascination—meaning that involves a state 
of rapt interest in it and also of absorption of oneself into it. 
*In being aware of it, one has a sense of one’s smallness and, for that reason, of 
there being a larger cosmic order. 
*We encounter the numinous when we listen to good music, and also when we 
experience romantic and erotic attachments. 
*The awe inspired by natural phenomena in those who are not jaded by 
scientific rationalism involves their being aware of the numinous. 
*The numinous is holy, a corollary (one not explicitly drawn by Otto) being 
that its existence imposes moral obligations on human beings and also gives them a 
sense of purpose. 
Awe and Terror 
The numinous inspires awe or terror, says Otto. I know that bears are 
dangerous, but I also understand them, since, being mammals, they are basically four-
legged versions of myself, and I am therefore not terrified of them. I am terrified of 
creatures, such as sharks and tarantulas, that I know to be dangerous and that are 
totally alien to me. If I became a marine biologist and came to understand such 
creatures, they would to that extent cease to terrify me, though I would still be duly 
afraid of them. 
Similarly, I am not awed by someone who runs faster than myself, since there 
is nothing mysterious to me about being able to run a 100-yard dash in 11 seconds, as 
opposed to twelve seconds. I would be awed by somebody who could paint an entire 
landscape in perfect detail from memory, since, not having artistic talent myself, I 
would not quite understand what was involved in his having this ability. But if I 
myself developed this ability, or at least learned what was involved in this other 
person’s having it, I would cease to be awed by his having it. 
The awe-inspiring and the terrifying are what we perceive to be supernatural. If 
vampires existed, they would be inherently terrifying, since, because they would be 
supernatural, mere mortals could not possibly ever understand them. And superheroes, 
if they existed, would be inherently awe-inspiring for the same reason mutatis 
mutandis. Sharks and tarantulas are terrifying to people who do not understand them 
and to whom they therefore might as well be supernatural, and they are not terrifying 
to those who study them scientifically and for whom they are therefore mere natural 
phenomena. Great art is awe-inspiring to those who have no idea how it comes into 
existence, and to whom it therefore has a supernatural quality, but not to great artists, 
who do have such an idea and to whom it therefore has no such quality. 
The Numinous as Projection of Passivity 
Otto never quite says what the numinous is. He says what it isn’t, and he lists 
off a few of its key attributes. But he can’t quite define it. The reason for this, contrary 
to what Otto himself says, is not that the numinous is inherently indefinable. It is 
rather that Otto is treating as an objective being—one that lies outside of ourselves—
when the truth is that it is obviously a psychological projection of some kind, and the 
question ‘what is the numinous?’ is a psychological, not a metaphysical question. 
When trying to form a clear conception of the numinous, the relevant question 
is: When do people experience it and when don’t they experience it? The answer is: 
They experience it when they have their guard down. The savage’s relationship to 
nature is one of openness and passive wonder. When one is listening to music, one is 
in a state of disinterested contemplation. Erotic and romantic attachments involve a 
condition of surrender. 
The tie-in to James is clear. James points out that people under the influence of 
drugs have experiences similar to those of the mystical variety, the reason being that 
such experiences are about passivity, as opposed to activity. The scientist’s attitude to 
nature is not one of passive wonder but of active deconstruction, and the forester’s 
attitude towards nature is one of literal deconstruction, this being why there is nothing 
numinous about nature for either. For the savage, nature is not to be mastered but 
passively experienced, this being why he experiences it as numinous. 
Part 4 Eliade’s Position 
The Sacred and the Profane 
According to Eliade, the essence of a genuinely religious person’s relation to 
the world is that he sees it as being either sacred or profane. Unlike the scientist, he 
does not see as it impersonal. The more genuinely religious a person is, the less he 
sees it as a mere machine, and the more likely he is to see a rock or twig or bolt of 
lightning as a manifestation of a beneficent higher presence, and therefore as ‘sacred’, 
or of a maleficent such presence, and therefore as ‘profane.’ The less religious a 
person is, the more he sees it as a mere machine, and the less likely he is to see a rock 
or a twig as anything other than a rock or a twig. 
Linear vs. Circular Time 
According to Eliade, primitive man, this being the most religious kind of man, 
conceives of time as circular. He does not see it as a linear march away from a past 
that becomes ever more remote. On the contrary, he sees time as being like the 
seasons. Indeed, his conception of time is very likely modeled on the seasons. As a 
matter of anthropological fact, Eliade is right that this is how human beings initially 
conceived of time. 
We obviously now conceive of time as being linear, meaning that at some point 
our conception of time underwent a major shift. According to Eliade, it was 
Abrahamic religion that brought about this shift. Such religions,  says Eliade, involve 
defining events (e.g. God speaking to Abraham, Moses being given the Ten 
Commandments, or Jesus turning water into wine); and because these events are of 
such singular significance, making it impossible for them to be duplicated, the march 
of time  is necessarily a march away from them and must therefore follow a linear 
path. 
  
Part 5 Writing as the Basis of Rationalism 
Economies of Scale Responsible for the Time-linearization 
  
Contrary to what Eliade alleges, the shift from a cyclical to a linear conception 
of time couldn’t possibly be a consequence of the advent of Judaism. First of all, it 
occurred independently in the Orient. Second, it occurred in the West prior to the 
advent of Judaism. The actual cause of this shift, in both the West and East, was the 
creation of the written word. This occurred in Mesopotamia approximately 6,000 
years ago.[6] Hash marks in clay were used to keep inventory, and this system of 
record keeping was then so generalized as to be able to represent arithmetical 
operations and also to be able to record the written word. Once the written word was 
established, it quickly led to the development of economies of scale and to the 
development of legal systems sufficiently complex to maintain such economies. 
It may well be that a cyclical conception of time retained a certain hold on 
literate pre-Abrahamic peoples, such as the Mesopotamians and the Egyptians. It may 
be, for example, that such a view is present in their myths. (Indeed, we will argue 
below that myths of their very nature presuppose such a conception of time.) And it 
may be that such a view is advocated in their ‘official’ theological works. But as soon 
as there were written records, time came to be thought of as linear. This is a matter of 
historical fact. 
And the explanation is obvious. With the written word, and the concomitant 
development of economies of scale, history came into existence. Functionally 
speaking, the life of a precivilizational person was cyclical. Each year was like the 
last. There were no technological changes and no economic development. And, of 
course, there were no written records and there was therefore no well-defined moment 
that receded into the past: no ‘year zero’--no 1492 or 1776. ‘History’ extended no 
further than one’s personal memory. 
Of course, children were told myths, and myths necessarily concern events that, 
if they actually occurred, did so in the past. But the events described in myths are 
better thought of as occurring in a hypothetical time; for it makes little sense to 
suppose that the events in Little Red Riding Hood preceded those in Jack in the Bean 
Stalk by 17 years or by 112 years. In general, it makes little sense to conceive of a 
series of actual events linking the events in some myth to events external to that myth. 
Myths therefore do not represent historical consciousness of history. On the contrary, 
they represent an ahistorical consciousness of lessons learned in a historical past. 
Writing was invented at approximately the same time that Judaism came into 
existence, this likely being what through Eliade off. Writing was invented first. As a 
result, it became possible for Moses to introduce writing to the Israelites, this being 
Judaism’s inaugural event (mythologically represented as God etching 
commandments into a tablet). Being a consequence of the written word, Judaism is 
the effect, not the cause, of the linearization of time. 
Religion as Early-stage Rationalism 
A civilization involves an economy of scale, along with complex legal and 
political arrangements. None of this can exist in the absence of rationalism. Small 
scale tribal organizations can exist in the absence of rationalism—and indeed depend 
on its absence. But where there is civilization, there are necessarily arrangements that 
are not strictly instinct-based or emotion-driven and that can be sustained only on the 
basis of rationalism-based social engineering. 
What Eliade describes as a shift from one kind of religion to another—what he 
describes as a shift from pre-Abrahamic to Abrahamic religions—is not a 
shift between religions at all. It is a shift from spiritualism to religion, spiritualism 
being the outlook of the precivilizational person and religion being the way that 
spiritualism is compatibilized with early-stage civilization. Judaism did not officially 
begin until norms of conduct were written down and codified; and those norms had to 
be codified, since unwritten understandings wouldn’t be capable of governing such a 
large and internally differentiated group. Christianity and Islam may have started out 
is informal movements that were governed more by sentiments than by codified 
norms. But they did not become full-blown religions until, like Judaism, they 
developed, and indeed identified with, complex legal and legalistic norms of conduct. 
Consequently, religion is not so much pre-rationalism or anti-rationalism as it 
is early-stage rationalism; it is not so much non-rationalism as it is the rationalism of 
early civilizations. As for what we now refer to as ‘rationalism’, that is late-stage 
rationalism—the rationalism of a civilization whose investigations into nature have 
started to acquire the same degree of logical rigor as the legal and economic norms 
involved in societies of scale. 
Writing and Rationality 
Intelligence is about making judgments about the world. (A fox is behaving 
intelligently if it correctly judges when to pounce on a rabbit.) Rationality is about 
making judgments about one’s intelligence. (I am being rational if I judge that a 
career in engineering would be a better use of my mathematical talents than a career 
as a bookmaker.) Can individuals be rational without being literate? Probably, but the 
written word certainly makes it easier than it would otherwise be for individuals to be 
intelligent. Can illiterate societies be rationally structured? Probably, but a literate 
society is able to do more in the way of rationally structuring itself than an illiterate 
one. 
In the West, our conception of time became linear at about the same time that 
the first Abrahamic faith came into existence. Eliade deduces from this that 
Abrahamism was responsible for the linearization of our time-concept. But this is 
simply false, given that there were many pre-Abrahamic civilizations—some of them 
dating back to 8,000 B.C.---whose conceptions of time were quite as linear as ours. 
Chapter 6 Spiritualism and Religion 
Religion Not what James, Otto, and Eliade are Examining 
When James, Otto, and Eliade refer to ‘religion’, they are not referring to 
religion at all, but rather to precivilizational spiritualism. Members of any given 
Abrahamic faith, or indeed of any religion unambiguously worthy of the name, tend to 
have worldviews that are largely indistinguishable from those of ardent rationalists. 
Yes—a fundamentalist Christian seems to have a few beliefs here and there that his 
non-religious counterpart does not have. 
But, first of all, is this really true? Does the contemporary fundamentalist 
Christian really believe that Christ walked on water? Does he believe it in the same 
sense in which he believes that he is a person or that fish live in water? Or is it rather 
that this so-called belief of his is more of a posit whose purpose is not so much to be 
true as it is to emblematize a set of values? 
Second, and more importantly, even if the fundamentalist 
Christian actually believes that Christ walked on water and rose from the dead, his 
understanding of the world is almost entirely identical with that of his non-religious 
counterpart. He doesn’t think that there are little people in his radio who are 
responsible for the noises it makes; he doesn’t think that every other twig and rock 
that he comes upon is a magic omen. His animism is confined to a small and tightly 
bounded collection of relics concerning alleged past miracles and the like, which 
relics—though obviously false and absurd if considered as representations of 
historical fact—are used in a very controlled and, indeed, rational way. 
For example, the Amish have many beliefs, for lack of a better term, about 
Moses, Jesus, God, and Virgin Birth that, if considered on their own, are obviously 
absurd but that the Amish use as the basis for extremely stable social arrangements, 
thanks to which the Amish work relatively short hours, live relatively long lives, have 
relatively happy marriages, and whose communities are virtually crime free.  
The Amish, despite having different values from ordinary ‘seculars’, like 
myself, see the world in the same way. If I see a rock, they see a rock; and if they see 
a twig, I see a twig. Unlike the precivilizational spiritualist, they don’t beat their 
amulets when angry, they don’t see tree-branches blowing in the wind as angry 
monster-arms. 
  
Spiritualism and Religion 
If the Amish aren’t religious, who is? So when James, Otto, and Eliade talk 
about ‘religion’, they cannot possibly be using this term correctly. Religious people—
such as the Amish and Hasidim---are no more likely than others to have ‘ineffable’ 
experiences of ‘numinous’ apparitions. They are no more likely than others to see 
rocks as beating monster-hearts. What is likely is they used to have such beliefs but no 
longer do, these former beliefs of theirs having long since hardened into mere 
acceptances or posits that function as foils for rationally worked out ethical and legal 
codes. 
When they refer to religion, what James, Otto, and Eliade are referring to is 
precivilizational spiritualism. They are referring to the mindset of somebody for 
whom rationalism was simply not an option. They are not referring to acceptance of 
some legalistic code of conduct that happens to contain a few throwbacks to 
spiritualism; they are not referring to the likes of Christianity and Islam, which, 
though occasionally referencing a snake that turned into a serpent or a talking bush, 
are complex and internally consistent behavioral codes that stabilize relations between 
man and woman, parent and child, employer and employee, and buyer and seller. The 
most die-hard fundamentalist Christian uses the internet and has a refrigerator and 
pays his taxes. His values may be slightly different from those of his neighbor, but his 
factual beliefs, with rare and dubious exceptions, are the same. The mentality that 
James, Otto, and Eliade are describing is not religious, but animistic.  
Granting that Otto, James, and Eliade should not have used the term ‘religion’ 
to refer to mindset they had in mind, it does not follow that what they said is false—
only that they could have worded it more clearly. 
So what did they say? 
To this we now turn. 
Part 7 James, Otto, and Eliade on the Limits of Rationalism 
James, Otto, and Eliade on Rationalism 
Rationalism begins when spiritualism ends. 
For the rationalist, there world is so many moving parts. There is nothing 
magical or mysterious about it. Yes, there is much that the rationalist doesn’t know 
and knows that he doesn’t know. But for the rationalist, unknowns are just gaps in his 
knowledge. They are not mysteries. 
For the rationalist, some parts of the world are useful, others are harmful, and 
others are neither. But nothing is sacred, and nothing is profane. 
For the rationalist, morality has to do with utility, not with divinity. Some legal 
codes work better than others; they lead to lower crime rates, higher GDPs, and the 
like. But that’s the end of it. 
For the rationalist, there is indeed morality, but there is no higher morality. 
Morality is another branch of engineering. 
For the rationalist, the world is impersonal. It is not a living being. It is just so 
much dead matter. There do existing living organisms, and a few of those are sentient. 
But for the rationalist, life, especially of the sentient variety, is an anomaly and must 
therefore be explained, with the qualification that ‘explaining’ it means reconciling its 
existence to an otherwise dead and non-sentient universe. 
For the rationalist, the world is an object. 
It exists only to be used. 
The rationalist sometimes cloaks his instrumentalist conception of nature by 
taking the position that he wants to understand the world, not use it. 
But to understand the world is to dissect it mentally, usually in furtherance of 
doing so literally. 
James, Otto, and Eliade on Spiritualism 
For the spiritualist, the world is a subject. 
For the spiritualist, the world, though having its uses, does not exist only to be 
used. It is more of a partner than an object. And, like a partner, it is teeming with life, 
and gives one’s life meaning. 
For the spiritualist, morality is emotional, not utilitarian in nature, based as it is 
not on utilitarian judgments about social stability but on an empathic rapport with God 
and nature. 
For the spiritualist, organisms are more basic than dead matter, the latter being 
mere vestiges of the former, and the very concept of an ‘impersonal force’ is alien to 
him. 
Conclusion: What Do These Authors Propose? 
Each of these authors repeatedly references the invigorating effects of 
spiritualism. Too much rationalism is morbid, they seem to be saying, the implication 
being that at least some spiritualism is necessary for mental health. 
But is this in fact what they are saying? Are they advocating a return to a 
condition of spiritualism? Do they want us to take Rousseau’s advice and revert a 
condition of innocent savagery? 
I would suggest a very different reading. Their position, I propose, is not that 
we should be more spiritual, but that we are already spiritual, even though we tend 
not to recognize the manifestations of our spiritualism for what they are. What these 
authors are saying about spiritualism is similar to what Freud says about sexuality. 
According to Freud, we cannot become asexual. What we can do is 
wrongly believe ourselves to be asexual and, on that basis, make life-decisions that 
thwart our sexuality and thereby undermine our biological condition. According to 
James, Otto, and Eliade, so I am suggesting, we cannot become non-spiritual. What 
we can do is wrongly believe that we are non-spiritual---possibly because we have 
erroneously come to see rationalism as a rejection, as opposed to a rarefied extension, 
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